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SECRET

-2- PARIS 13624, MARCH 7, 1967

3. STANLEY SAID HE THOUGHT THE CHAIRMAN'S REPORT WAS COMPREHENSIVE AND WELL-BALANCED, BUT THAT HE MIGHT USEFULLY MAKE SOME AMPLIFICATION ABOUT MR MCCLOY'S PRESENTATION AT THE TRIPARTITE TALKS, WHICH MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO THE DPWG. MCCLOY HAD BEGUN BY MAKING CLEAR HIS ABSENCE FROM THE MONDAY MEETING HAD NOT BEEN BECAUSE OF PERSONAL COMMITMENTS BUT BECAUSE THE SUBJECT MATTER WAS SO IMPORTANT THAT HE FELT HE COULD NOT PARTICIPATE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT, WHICH TOOK TIME TO DEVELOP IN VIEW OF THE EXTENSIVE INTRA-CABINET--AND EVEN CONGRESSIONAL--CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN INVOLVED. STANLEY ADDED THAT THE

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PRESS ACCOUNTS SEEMED TO HIM REASONABLY ACCURATE, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WORTH MENTIONING THAT MCCLOY HAD SPOKEN VERY STRONGLY--EVEN PLUNTLY--AND CRITICIZED BY IMPLICATION AT LEAST VARIOUS PROMOUNCEMENTS AND PRESS STATEMENTS IN ALL THREE GOVERNMENTS WHICH, MCCLOY FELT, WERE CREATING THE WRONG ATMOSPHERE. MCCLOY HAD STRESSED THAT THE UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS--BRITISH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, GERMANY'S BUDGET CRISIS, US PAYMENTS PROBLEMS AND THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENT--SHOULD NOT OBSCURE THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A STRONG NATO; THAT BOTH IN THE PRESENT AND WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE HOPES FOR IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS WE MUST REST ON A FIRM NATO FOUNDATION--NOT ONE WHICH WAS SEEN TO BE "UNRAVELLING". HE WAS THEREFORE AUTHORIZED TO SAY ON BEHALF OF HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THE US WOULD DO ITS PART AND MORE IF OTHERS DID THEIRS. MCCLOY ALSO STRESSED THAT THERE SHOULD NOT BE UNILATERAL ACTIONS AND THAT NATO MUST CONSIDER AND TAKE PART IN ANY DECISIONS. BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE PROBLEMS, MCCLOY'S STATEMENT HAD REFLECTED THE FLEXIBILITY IN THE US APPROACH TO THE OFFSET PROBLEM, WHICH HAD ALSO BEEN HIGHLIGHTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS STATEMENT IN WASHINGTON. IN CONCLUSION, STANLEY SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY FELT THAT MR MCCLOY'S STATEMENT IN THE TRIPARTITE TALKS REFLECTED HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT AND THUS REPRESENTED A REAFFIRMATION OF THE

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IMPORTANCE OF NATO, AND THE PRIORITY OF ITS CONTINUED VITALITY OVER CURRENT SHORT-TERM PROBLEMS, HOWEVER PRESSING AND PAINFUL THESE MIGHT BE.

4. HOCKADAY THEN SAID THAT SINCE HE REPRESENTED ALL THE NATO GOVERNMENTS HE HAD NOT FELT FREE TO GO INTO DETAILS ABOUT ONE STATEMENT, BUT HE WAS GRATEFUL TO THE US REP FOR THE ADDITIONAL REMARKS ABOUT MCCLOY'S VERY IMPORTANT STATEMENT.


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5. THE FRG REP MADE NO COMMENT; THE UK REP



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8. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE NORWEGIAN AND NETHERLANDS STATEMENTS WERE THE ONLY FORMAL INTERVENTIONS, INFORMAL COMMENTS AFTER THE MEETING SUGGEST THAT THEY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY OF NON-TRIPARTITE COUNTRIES. HOW STRONGLY AND AT WHAT LEVELS OTHER DELEGATIONS FEEL CONCERN AT THE CONTINUED TRIPARTITE ACTIVITY REMAINS TO BE SEEN

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
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-2- LONDON 7391 (SECTION ONE OF TWO) MARCH 14

3. PRIOR TO 6 P M. TRIPARTITE MEETING FONOFF OFFICIALS
CALLED EMBASSY TO STATE



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GP-3 CLEVELAND

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